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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN T ANGARO, d.b.a. 
TANGARO LOAN AND JEWELRY 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
AUGUSTINE LOPEZ MARRERO, 
JACINTO RENEEN (RIVERA) and 
EVANGELINE LOPEZ, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9603 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County. 
Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit on a promissory note in which the 
makers, AUGUSTINE LOPEZ MARRERO and 
EVANGELINE LOPEZ borrowed money from Plaintiff 
and JACINTO RIVERA, signed the note as a surety. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson, sitting without a jury. After hearing the evi-
dence Judge Jeppson found the issues in favor of Defend-
ant Rivera and against Plaintiff holding that the note 
had been discharged by Marrero and Lopez signing a 
new note. Marrero had been discharged in bankruptcy 
and listed the note as one of the obligations. Plaintiff 
made a motion for new trial on the ground that there 
'vas insufficient evidence to justify the decision and that 
it is against law. The motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff owned and operated a loan business in Bing-
ham Canyon, Utah. On or about April 26, 1957, Defend-
ant Marrero came to Plaintiff's place of business and bor-
ro,ved $2,586.00 and signed a promissory note for that 
amount. Plaintiff informed Marrero that he had to have 
a co-signer with security. Defendant Marero obtained 
Defendant Rivera, who owned real property in Bingham 
Canyon, and a woman Evangeline Lopez, with whom 
he was living. The money was received by Defendant 
Marrero. Under the terms of the note, Defendants agreed 
to pay $50.00 each payday until the note with interest 
was paid in full. 
The payments of $50.00 were made until Defendant 
l\-larrero, who was then working for Kennecott, went on 
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3 
a four day a week shift. He then requested Plaintiff to 
reduce payments to $25.00 each pay day until he, Mar-
rero went back to a full five day week shift. Plaintiff 
testified he first obtained permission for such a change 
from Defendant Rivera and that Rivera consented. This 
continued until April 4, 1959 when Defendant Marrero 
filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. 
At that time there was a balance owing of $1,083.50 
(Tr. 11). 
Plaintiff thereupon made demand upon Defendant 
Rivera for payment of the balance owing upon said note. 
Upon his refusal this action was commenced. 
After hearing this matter, the Court, sitting without 
a jury, found the issues in favor of Defendant Rivera, 
against Plaintiff. The Court, at the time of its ruling 
found that there was a new note; that the old note was 
discharged. 
On the issue of usury and the effect of the co-maker 
changing the terms of the payments the Court specific-
ally made no ruling or decision (Tr. P. 82). 
Plaintiff thereupon made a motion for new trial upon 
the grounds, among others of: 
( 1) error in law and 
( 2) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the deci-
sion at that it against law. The Court denied the motion. 
From the decision at the time of trial and the Court's 
further ruling denying Plaintiff's motion for new trial, 
Plaintiff appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN FAV-
OR OF DEFENDANT AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
IN ITS FINDING THAT A NEW NOTE HAD BEEN 
SIGNED AND THE NOTE WHICH DEFENDANT 
RIVERA HAD BEEN DISCHARGED. 
In this case the Plaintiff, according to the ruling of 
the Court, released the only security which he had, to 
wit, Rivera, and loaned Marrero more money. 
The Court had to believe Marrero when he testified 
( Tr. 27 p. 17 to 25 ) Plaintiff, Tangaro, in substance told 
him he would make a new note without Rivera to se-
cure it. 
In the case of Holmes vs. Nelson, 7 Utah 2nd 435, 
326 P.2nd 722 the Court held the evidence was insuffi-
cient to sustain the vedict. Mr. Justice Crockett: 
"The prerogative (to set aside the verdict of the jury) 
should only be exercised when in the view of the trial 
Court, it seems clear that the Jury had misapplied or 
failed to take into account proven facts; or misunder-
stood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence so that the verdict 
is offensive to his sense of justice to the extent that he 
cannot in good conscience permit it to stand." 
The testimony of Marrero, who had discharged his 
obligations by going into bankruptcy regarding a new 
note does not make sense. He wanted the Court to be-
lieve that Tangero had him sign a new note and gave 
him more money without the signature of Defendant 
Rivera. (Tr. 30 line 25-30) (Tr. 31 1-30). 
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:Lviarrero indicates that with all the payments which 
he made he did not get a receipt. However, the book 
tallys with the note and according to Plaintiff's testimony 
all payments \vere made. 
We submit that the testimony of the witness and 
Defendant Marrero just doesn't sound like the transac-
tion of an ordinary business man, nor is it supported by 
any of the weight of the evidence. (Tr. 43 Lines 6-23). 
Q. When did he say he was going to make a new 
note? 
A. He told me he gave me that new note in blank, 
like that one, to sign. I signed it and he told me to bring 
my wife down to sign it too, and he say, "No, just you 
and your wife is enough" and he said - he give me 
$150.00 and the necklaces, - the two necklace I buy 
from him." 
He say he going to figure ho\v much the 2 necklaces 
and the $150.00 and put it together for the old note, 
and he going to give me the old note after Christmas, 
the old note is going to be paid already, he say. 
Q. That was before Christmas, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, when I signed the new note in blank, sir. 
Q. Christmas of '58? 
A. Yes. 
This testimony the Court believed. On the other hand 
j\farrero testified Tangaro did not give him full credit 
for the months paid (Tr. 30 Lines 0-30). 
However, when the receipts were compared with the 
cedits on the note they came out exactly and the evi-
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dence appeared clear that Tangaro gave him full credit 
for all payments. (Tr. 44 lines 2 to 26). 
Most of the testimony and discussion by the Court 
and counsel pertained to the question of usury. The Court 
even permitted Mr. Maw to amend his answer to allege 
usury (Tr. 77 line 22-30). 
There was considerable evidence about whether or 
not the changing of the terms of the note, by reducing 
the payments fom $50.00 to $25.00 was with the con-
sent of the guarantor. (Tr. 12 line 14-30) (Tr. 13 line 
1-30) (Tr. 45- 1-30). 
However, the Court chose to avoid these questions 
of law and to make its ruling on the factual question 
and to believe Marrero that a new note had been made. 
In Mack vs. Reading Co. 3 77 Pa.135, 103 At. 2nd 
7 49 41 ALR 2nd 927 the Court in discussing this very 
question stated; 'If in the opinion of the Court, the verdict 
of a jury indicates a capricious disregard of persuasive 
testimony, the judicial remedy is a setting aside of the 
verdict and the granting of a new trial." 
In Franklin Discount Co. vs. Ford 27 NJ 473, 143 
Atl. 2nd 161, 73 ALR 2nd 1316, the Court in its opinion 
stated: 
"Upon motion for new trial the trial Judge must 
weigh the evidence and if it be so overwhelming on one 
side 'as to give rise to inescapable conclusion of mistake~ 
passion, prejudice or partiality it cannot serve to support 
the judgment.' " 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ARBITRARILY IN ITS REFUSAL 
TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO REOPEN TO OFFER 
FlJRTHER TESTIMONY THAT THERE WAS NO 
NEW NOTE WHEN THERE WAS SOME DOUBT 
IN THE COURT'S MIND AS TO WHETHER SUCH 
EVIDENCE HAD BEEN OFFERED. 
In summation the Court stated that there was no 
denial on the Plaintiff's part of having made a new note. 
During Plaintiff's cross-examination and all the way 
through his testimony, Plaintiff, in discussing the adding 
on of interest states that the reason it was added on, 
\\'as because Defendants would not sign a renewal note. 
(Tr. 21, line 4-12) When Plaintiff's counsel requested 
leave to reopen to make this more clear to the Court 
he was refused. ( Tr. 82 line 3-9) 
Again, Plaintiff, on cross examination stated in re-
sponse to Mr. Maw's question; "that the additional loan 
by ~Iarrero, payments thereon were credited in a sepa-
rate column on the note. (Tr. 19-line 30 Tr. 20 line 1-10) 
We are aware of the fact that the matters herein 
complained of by the trial Judge were somewhat discre-
tionary, but this discretion cannot be arbitrary. This 
Honorable Court in Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. 
Inc. v. Flint, etal, 1952, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2nd 826 
pointed out that the matter of granting a ne'v trial was 
discretionary with the trial Judge, but that there could 
not be an abuse of this discretion. 
"Van Cott, Jr. District Judge : 
"It is axiom a tic in this State that the decision of 
the trial Judge in reference to the granting or refusing 
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of motions for new trials is a discretionary matter, pro-
vided there is not an abuse of discretion and there is 
reason to believe that a miscarriage of justice would 
result if refused." 
In the present case the Court, after discussing with 
counsel, usury and the effect upon the surety of reduc-
ing the amount of the payments, decided to believe the 
statement of the Defendant Marrero, who had nothing 
to lose because of a bankruptcy bar and held there was 
a new note. The Court's refusal to permit Plaintiff to 
reopen or to examine the record, after the Court ex-
pressed an opinion that there was no testimony of Plain-
tiff regarding a renewal note, was, we respectfully submit 
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 
In Liepert v. Honold 39 Cal. 2nd 462, 247 P. 2nd 
324, 29 ALR 1185 the question of abuse of discretion 
was discussed as follows : 
"The decision on limiting the new trial ap-
propriately rests in the discretion of the trial 
judge. It is presumed that in passing upon the 
motion he has weighed the evidence and the pos-
sibility of prejudice to the defendant. His deci-
sion 'vill not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse 
of discretion is shown. Tumelty v. Peerless Stages, 
96 Cal App 530, 532, 274 P 430; Amore v. Di 
Vest a, 125 Cal App 410, 413, 13 P2d986; San ford 
v. Wilcox 13 Cal App 2d 193, 194, 56 P2d 548; 
Tripcevich v. Compton, 25 Cal App 2d 188, 191, 
77 P2d 286; Noffart v. Southern Pacific Co. 33 
Cal. App. 2d 591, 602 92 P2d 436; Cox v. Tyrone 
Power Enterprises Inc. 49 Cal. App 2d 383, 390, 
121 P2d 829; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal App 
2d 117, 118, 124 P 2d 80; Hughes v. Schwartz, 
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51 Cal App 2d 362, 364-365, 124 P 2d 886; Tor-
nell v. Munson 80 Cal App 2d 123, 124, 181 P 2d 
112. 
Such an abuse is shown when the damages are inade-
quate, the record discloses that the issue of liability is 
close, and other circumstances indicate that the verdict 
"vas probably the result of prejudice, sympathy or com-
promise or that for some other reason the liability issue 
has not actually been detemined. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that there was 
no evidence of any value to support Defendant's story 
that Plaintiff would write a new note and release Rivera 
from the old one and in addition give Marrero more 
money. 
This is contrary to reason and supported only by the 
statements of Marrero and his common law wife, after 
he had gotten out of the payment of the note through 
his discharge in bankruptcy. 
There was no competent evidence to support the 
testimony of Defendant Marrero that Plaintiff had made 
a new note and discharged the first one by so making 
the new note. 
We further respectfully submit that the Court, after 
spending nearly the entire time of trial discussing usury 
and the question of the effect upon Rivera's liability by 
Plaintiff's permitting Defendant Marrero to make small-
er payments while he was out of work, and then refusing 
to permit Plaintiff to clear up by his testimony any ques-
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tion of a new note, when the trial Judge stated from 
the bench that he did not recall Plaintiff having denied 
the making of another note, was purely arbitrary and 
an abuse of the Court's discretion. 
Based on the record we thereby submit Plaintiff is 
entitled to a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted 
LaMAR DUNCAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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